"Allegations" in federal complaint
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"Allegations" in federal complaint
"Allegations" in federal complaint
http://www.lansnerkubitschek.com/news/whatnew-1.html
III. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
3. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf, and, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2), on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons. Upon information and belief, the class presently consists of more than 5000 persons, and will include more than 1000 new persons each year.
4. The class is defined as:
a. All victims of domestic violence in the City of New York who have been investigated by the Administration for Children's Services regarding allegations that they have abused or neglected their children by reason of said domestic violence, or who will be investigated in the future; and
b. All domestic violence victims who have wanted or will want to seek protection from their batterers from the New York Police Department, or from another City agency, or from the courts, but who fear that the Administration for Children's Services will remove their children if they do so; and
c. All minor children of the parents listed in the previous subparagraphs.
5. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
6. There are questions of law and fact common to the class.
7. Common questions of fact include:
a. Whether defendants have a policy or practice of removing children from their mothers for the sole or primary reason that the mothers are victims of domestic violence, i.e., without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health; and
b. Whether defendants have a policy or practice of removing children from mothers who are victims of domestic violence without following the requirements regarding prior notice and hearings set out by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999); and
c. Whether defendants have a policy or practice of removing children from mothers who are victims of domestic violence without investigating whether the children will be in danger if they remain with their mothers; and
d. Whether, after removing children whose mothers are victims of domestic violence, defendants have a policy or practice of detaining the children in government custody without investigating whether the children will be in danger if they return to their mothers; and
e. Whether defendants have a policy or practice of demanding that mothers who are victims of domestic violence leave their homes as a condition of retaining or regaining custody of their children, regardless of whether the home is dangerous; and
f. Whether defendants have a policy or practice of demanding that mothers who are victims of domestic violence enroll in psychotherapy or counseling as a condition of retaining or regaining custody of their children, i.e., without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health; and
g. Whether, after removing children whose mothers are victims of domestic violence, defendants have a policy or practice of shifting the burden to the mothers to prove that the mothers will not be battered in the future, before defendants agree to return the children to the mothers; and
h. Whether defendants have a policy or practice of failing to offer services to domestic violence victims and their children, to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the children; and
i. Whether being a victim of domestic violence renders a mother a per se unfit parent; and
j. Whether defendants Scoppetta and City fail to provide adequate training to employees of the Administration for Children's Services in handling cases involving domestic violence allegations.
8. Common questions of law include:
a. Whether a policy of separating children from their mothers merely because the mothers are victims of domestic violence violates the constitutional rights of the mothers to the care and custody of their children, i.e., without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health; and
b. Whether a policy of separating children from their mothers merely because the mothers are victims of domestic violence - i.e., without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health - violates the constitutional rights of the children to a family relationship; and
c. Whether a policy of removing children from their mothers without investigating whether the children are in danger violates the rights of the children to be free of unreasonable seizures; and
d. Whether a policy of removing children from mothers who are victims of domestic violence, without following the requirements regarding prior notice and hearings set out by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999), violates the rights of the mothers to procedural due process of law; and
e. Whether a policy of removing children from mothers who are victims of domestic violence, without following the requirements regarding prior notice and hearings set out by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999) violates the rights of the children to procedural due process of law; and
f. Whether the failure of defendants Scoppetta and City to provide adequate training to employees of the Administration for Children's Services violates the constitutional rights of victims of domestic violence and their children.
III. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
3. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf, and, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2), on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons. Upon information and belief, the class presently consists of more than 5000 persons, and will include more than 1000 new persons each year.
4. The class is defined as:
a. All victims of domestic violence in the City of New York who have been investigated by the Administration for Children's Services regarding allegations that they have abused or neglected their children by reason of said domestic violence, or who will be investigated in the future; and
b. All domestic violence victims who have wanted or will want to seek protection from their batterers from the New York Police Department, or from another City agency, or from the courts, but who fear that the Administration for Children's Services will remove their children if they do so; and
c. All minor children of the parents listed in the previous subparagraphs.
5. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
6. There are questions of law and fact common to the class.
7. Common questions of fact include:
a. Whether defendants have a policy or practice of removing children from their mothers for the sole or primary reason that the mothers are victims of domestic violence, i.e., without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health; and
b. Whether defendants have a policy or practice of removing children from mothers who are victims of domestic violence without following the requirements regarding prior notice and hearings set out by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999); and
c. Whether defendants have a policy or practice of removing children from mothers who are victims of domestic violence without investigating whether the children will be in danger if they remain with their mothers; and
d. Whether, after removing children whose mothers are victims of domestic violence, defendants have a policy or practice of detaining the children in government custody without investigating whether the children will be in danger if they return to their mothers; and
e. Whether defendants have a policy or practice of demanding that mothers who are victims of domestic violence leave their homes as a condition of retaining or regaining custody of their children, regardless of whether the home is dangerous; and
f. Whether defendants have a policy or practice of demanding that mothers who are victims of domestic violence enroll in psychotherapy or counseling as a condition of retaining or regaining custody of their children, i.e., without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health; and
g. Whether, after removing children whose mothers are victims of domestic violence, defendants have a policy or practice of shifting the burden to the mothers to prove that the mothers will not be battered in the future, before defendants agree to return the children to the mothers; and
h. Whether defendants have a policy or practice of failing to offer services to domestic violence victims and their children, to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the children; and
i. Whether being a victim of domestic violence renders a mother a per se unfit parent; and
j. Whether defendants Scoppetta and City fail to provide adequate training to employees of the Administration for Children's Services in handling cases involving domestic violence allegations.
8. Common questions of law include:
a. Whether a policy of separating children from their mothers merely because the mothers are victims of domestic violence violates the constitutional rights of the mothers to the care and custody of their children, i.e., without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health; and
b. Whether a policy of separating children from their mothers merely because the mothers are victims of domestic violence - i.e., without probable cause to believe that continuing in the care of their mothers presents an imminent danger to the children's life or health - violates the constitutional rights of the children to a family relationship; and
c. Whether a policy of removing children from their mothers without investigating whether the children are in danger violates the rights of the children to be free of unreasonable seizures; and
d. Whether a policy of removing children from mothers who are victims of domestic violence, without following the requirements regarding prior notice and hearings set out by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999), violates the rights of the mothers to procedural due process of law; and
e. Whether a policy of removing children from mothers who are victims of domestic violence, without following the requirements regarding prior notice and hearings set out by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999) violates the rights of the children to procedural due process of law; and
f. Whether the failure of defendants Scoppetta and City to provide adequate training to employees of the Administration for Children's Services violates the constitutional rights of victims of domestic violence and their children.
http://www.cir-usa.org/legal_docs/muell ... amcplt.pdf
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
38. With respect to their claims for forward-looking injunctive and declaratory relief,
plaintiffs seek to represent a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), of all individuals who bring children
into emergency rooms of hospitals, or will do so in the future. As a consequence of defendants'
unconstitutional policies, members of this class are in danger of having custody of their children
unconstitutionally taken from them when they make reasonable medical decisions for their
children's care.
39. The class is sufficiently numerous and diffuse that joinder of all members is
impracticable.
40. There are questions of law common to the class, viz., whether the policy of
depriving parents of custody of their children in the absence of imminent harm violates the Constitution.
41. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the class they seek to represent, and they
are adequate representatives of that class.
42. Defendants have acted and/or threaten to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class thereby making appropriate final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
38. With respect to their claims for forward-looking injunctive and declaratory relief,
plaintiffs seek to represent a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), of all individuals who bring children
into emergency rooms of hospitals, or will do so in the future. As a consequence of defendants'
unconstitutional policies, members of this class are in danger of having custody of their children
unconstitutionally taken from them when they make reasonable medical decisions for their
children's care.
39. The class is sufficiently numerous and diffuse that joinder of all members is
impracticable.
40. There are questions of law common to the class, viz., whether the policy of
depriving parents of custody of their children in the absence of imminent harm violates the Constitution.
41. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the class they seek to represent, and they
are adequate representatives of that class.
42. Defendants have acted and/or threaten to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class thereby making appropriate final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief.
http://www.lassennews.com/News_Story.edi?sid=3556
The suit, filed in the United States District Court, Eastern District of California, alleges the defendants
violated the plaintiff’s’ Constitutional rights under the First, Fourth and 14th Amendments.
The suit also charges the defendants with
intentional infliction of emotional distress,
liability under state law for negligence for failure to fulfill a mandatory duty and
negligence.
The plaintiffs in the case, Amy McConnell and her four minor children...
The suit, filed in the United States District Court, Eastern District of California, alleges the defendants
violated the plaintiff’s’ Constitutional rights under the First, Fourth and 14th Amendments.
The suit also charges the defendants with
intentional infliction of emotional distress,
liability under state law for negligence for failure to fulfill a mandatory duty and
negligence.
The plaintiffs in the case, Amy McConnell and her four minor children...
http://members.aol.com/topcat3434/1b.htm
Not a child protection case, but notice the wording.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
6. The New Jersey State Police is a program or activity of the State of New Jersey funded, in part, by funds made available under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, as amended ("Safe Streets Act").
7. Defendants have engaged in and continue to engage in a pattern or practice of performing vehicle stops and post-stop enforcement actions and procedures, including searches, of African American motorists traveling on New Jersey roadways, including the New Jersey Turnpike, that:
a. have the intent of discriminating on the basis of race; and
b. use criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of race.
8. Defendants, through their acts or omissions, have tolerated and continue to tolerate racially discriminatory law enforcement by New Jersey State troopers, described in ¶ 7 above.
These acts or omissions include, but are not limited to:
a. failing to implement and enforce policies related to vehicle stops that appropriately guide and limit the discretion of individual troopers;
b. failing to train troopers adequately to prevent racially discriminatory conduct related to vehicle stops;
c. failing to supervise troopers adequately to prevent racially discriminatory conduct related to vehicle stops;
d. failing to monitor troopers adequately who engage in or may be likely to engage in racially discriminatory conduct related to vehicle stops;
e. failing to establish a procedure whereby all civilian complaints are documented, and are investigated and adjudicated adequately; and
f. failing to discipline adequately troopers who engage in racially discriminatory conduct related to vehicle stops.
9. The pattern or practice, described in ¶¶ 7-8 above, constitutes intentional racial discrimination by defendants in performing vehicle stops and post-stop enforcement actions and procedures, including searches, of African American motorists traveling on New Jersey highways, including the New Jersey Turnpike.
Not a child protection case, but notice the wording.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
6. The New Jersey State Police is a program or activity of the State of New Jersey funded, in part, by funds made available under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, as amended ("Safe Streets Act").
7. Defendants have engaged in and continue to engage in a pattern or practice of performing vehicle stops and post-stop enforcement actions and procedures, including searches, of African American motorists traveling on New Jersey roadways, including the New Jersey Turnpike, that:
a. have the intent of discriminating on the basis of race; and
b. use criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of race.
8. Defendants, through their acts or omissions, have tolerated and continue to tolerate racially discriminatory law enforcement by New Jersey State troopers, described in ¶ 7 above.
These acts or omissions include, but are not limited to:
a. failing to implement and enforce policies related to vehicle stops that appropriately guide and limit the discretion of individual troopers;
b. failing to train troopers adequately to prevent racially discriminatory conduct related to vehicle stops;
c. failing to supervise troopers adequately to prevent racially discriminatory conduct related to vehicle stops;
d. failing to monitor troopers adequately who engage in or may be likely to engage in racially discriminatory conduct related to vehicle stops;
e. failing to establish a procedure whereby all civilian complaints are documented, and are investigated and adjudicated adequately; and
f. failing to discipline adequately troopers who engage in racially discriminatory conduct related to vehicle stops.
9. The pattern or practice, described in ¶¶ 7-8 above, constitutes intentional racial discrimination by defendants in performing vehicle stops and post-stop enforcement actions and procedures, including searches, of African American motorists traveling on New Jersey highways, including the New Jersey Turnpike.
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