TPR cases reversed on appeal

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Marina
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TPR cases reversed on appeal

Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 4:46 pm

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http://courts.co.calhoun.mi.us/08juv013.htm

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS REVERSED IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.

By Judge Susan L. Dobrich

In the matter of Anthony James Ashman, Valerie Marie Ashman, and Timothy Ryan Ashman, Minors, Unpublished No. 277222, April 10, 2008



Respondent mother had her parental rights terminated based on allegations of failing to protect her children, when she was aware of the sexual abuse of the children by their father and grandfather, allowed them to be alone with the men, and coached the children to lie about the abuse. The mother appealed as of right, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
From the moment of the children’s removal, the respondent complied with a Parent Agency Agreement (PPA), and received favorable and supportive evaluations from therapists and other service providers. Although the mother had a few missteps during the time the children were wards of the court, none of the therapists or service providers felt these setbacks were crucial. At the time of termination, the children were 16, 15, and 13 years old. All three children testified that they did not want their mother’s parental rights terminated.

The Court of Appeals, seemingly substituting their judgment for that of the trial court, reversed and remanded. They held that it was in clear error that the trial found clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for termination. Reciting the testimony and evidence produced at trial, they found that the respondent mother had made “significant strides towards remedying [her] problems.” In re Boursaw, 239 Mich App 161; 607 NW2d 408 (1999).

This case appears to signal a greater willingness on the part of the Court of Appeals, to reverse a trial court’s determination to terminate parental rights.

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Marina
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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 5:00 pm

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http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/court_o ... /8-288.pdf

Father appeals the district court’s ruling terminating his parental rights on the ground he abandoned his child.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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Grounds for terminating parental rights must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Iowa Code § 600A.8; see In re Goettsche, 311 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 1981). We can only address best interest after the grounds for termination have been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

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Jacob was not certain the child was his until three days before trial.

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clearly a parent under these circumstances could not be found to have abandoned a child in three days particularly where, as here, Jacob sought to have paternity verified when he first learned there may be a child and it may be his.

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BEST INTEREST.

Statutory grounds for termination must be established in addition to establishing the child’s best interests in order to terminate. Id. at 245; In re L.H., 480 N.W.2d 43, 47 (Iowa 1992); In re B.L.A., 357 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Iowa 1984). Parental rights may not be terminated solely on consideration of the child’s best interest but specific grounds for termination under chapter 600A must also be established. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 245.
Because we have not found that there is clear and convincing evidence of abandonment we need not address the best interest challenge and cannot. We recognize Jacob’s current situation does not present the child with an ideal home life; yet, we are presented with no evidence about the attributes of the persons seeking to adopt this child. While the guardian ad litem and the juvenile court have said termination of Jacob’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest,

other than evidence adverse to Jacob, there is nothing else to review to assure us that the persons seeking to adopt will in fact provide a better home.
We reverse and remand to the district court to do all that is necessary to protect the child’s interest including taking additional evidence.
...

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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 5:04 pm

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http://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/pubopin ... enDocument

Parents appeal a judgment terminating their parental rights to their two children, J.M. and K.M. The trial court terminated their rights on three grounds: mental condition, failure to support and failure to rectify. On appeal, they argue that the trial court's findings were not supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and that that termination was not in the children's best interests.

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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 5:10 pm

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http://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/pubopin ... enDocument

L. W. ("Mother") appeals from the trial court's judgment terminating her parental rights to her children, K.L.W., S.F.W., and L.S.W. (collectively, the "Children"). Mother raises four points on appeal. Because Mother's first point on appeal is dispositive, we will not address Mother's remaining points. Mother argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to the Children because the trial court did not comply with section 211.455, RSMo 2000, which requires that a meeting between the juvenile officer and the trial court occur after the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights.

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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 5:13 pm

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http://www.wisbar.org/res/capp/2002/01-2787.htm

¶1. ROGGENSACK, J.1This case involves the termination of the parental rights of Robert R., to his son, Thomas R., who was born during Robert's marriage to Tammie C. We conclude that in order to terminate Robert's parental rights the circuit court must have had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Because the court did not have personal jurisdiction over Robert, the order terminating his parental rights to Thomas is reversed.

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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 5:39 pm

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Virginia Table of cases

http://www.courts.state.va.us/ed/resour ... _table.pdf

Search document for "reversed."

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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 5:41 pm


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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 5:53 pm

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http://courts.co.calhoun.mi.us/08juv016.htm

TERMINATION OF A FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS WERE REVERSED AND THE CASE REMANDED BECAUSE THE CASEWORKER’S ZEALOUS EFFORTS AIMED AT TERMINATION INSTEAD OF REUNIFICATION DENIED THE RESPONDENT FATHER OPPORTUNITIES TO DEVELOP AND ACQUIRE PARENTING SKILLS TO REGAIN CUSTODY OF HIS CHILD By Judge Thomas E. Nelson
DHS v. Schafer, (Unpublished, #280252), 5/22/08

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The trial court terminated the father’s rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii), (g) and (j). The Court of Appeals reversed finding that there was insufficient evidence produced to support the statutory grounds for terminating his parental rights.
The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the father’s 3 month old child in July 2005 based on the mother’s plea to allegations concerning her substance abuse and mental instability. The petition contained no allegations concerning the father. The case service plan required the father to participate in services to improve his emotional stability and parenting skills and to maintain a “substance free lifestyle”. Thereafter the parents followed through on recommendations to improve their parenting skills and generally did well. In July 2006 the child was returned to the parents.

On October 1, 2006, the father and mother—who was intoxicated when she was supposed to be caring for the child—were purportedly involved in a domestic dispute. No criminal charges were filed. Nevertheless, the petitioner (DHS) filed a supplemental petition to remove the child from the parents’ home. The child was removed and placed back in foster care. In December, 2006 a termination petition was filed. That petition was filed on December 15, 2006 shortly after a new caseworker was assigned to the family on November 20, 2006. By that time, the caseworker had observed only one visit between the father and child. The caseworker’s concern was with the father’s “substance abuse” and his denial of fault with regard to the child’s removal.

A license psychologist evaluated the father and testified that there was no indication that he had any alcohol or substance abuse problem. A negative substance abuse assessment concerning the father was also admitted into evidence. Furthermore, the caseworker admitted there were no confirmed reports of the father abusing substances. Four other professional service providers who worked extensively with the father testified that there was no indication the father had alcohol or drug problems. In other words, the caseworker’s “substance abuse” concern was unsubstantiated. Respondent father’s denial of fault for the removal of the child was supported by the evidence.

At the close of proofs at the termination hearing, the mother (who had confirmed substance abuse and mental health issues) had her parental rights terminated. The court denied the request to terminate the father’s rights. However, the court advised the father that he would need “to take it to the next level and really make sure that he had a strong support system in place”. In addition, the judge requested that the caseworker assign the father a “father mentor”.

While the father worked toward reunification by attending parenting classes and visiting the minor, the worker never assigned him a mentor. Following the father’s remarriage to a woman he had known for some 9 months, the caseworker filed a second termination petition on July 9, 2007. That petition alleged that the father failed to 1) maintain a sober lifestyle; 2) address ‘co-dependency’ issues; 3) take responsibility for the situation leading to the child’s removal; 4) improve his parenting skills and 5) maintain full time employment. Again the evidence did not support the caseworker’s claims.

The father was subjected to numerous, unannounced, random alcohol and drug screens (even one at 7:30 a.m.). The 7:30 a.m. test was positive for marijuana. The father denied using although he admitted being in the company of others who were using the drug. Several other screens before and after that one were negative. There was no other evidence of marijuana use. The father denied having a substance abuse problem. No professional service providers identified respondent as having an alcohol or substance abuse problem. No competent or persuasive evidence from the beginning of the case to its end supported the caseworker’s claim that the father had a substance abuse or alcohol problem.

The caseworker also maintained the father failed to address his “co dependency” issues. While one of the counselors working with the father identified “possible co dependency” issues, the licensed professional counselor/parent educator working with the father indicated she addressed the underlying issues of ‘co dependency’ in her training with dad. Thus, those issues were addressed and according to the parent educator they did not prohibit the father from parenting his son. While the caseworker claimed that the father’s marriage was a result of his ‘co dependency’, that claim was without merit. In fact, the judge’s request after the first termination hearing was that the father secure a support system. His marriage was such an attempt and furthermore the educator was impressed with the father’s new wife and her parenting skills.


In addition, the caseworker again claimed the father failed to take responsibility for the situation leading to his child’s removal. While the removal was due primarily to the child’s mother’s mental instability and substance abuse issues, the father did (according to one counselor working with him) accept some responsibility for the child being in foster care but still did want to be reunified with him.

While the caseworker alleged the father failed to improve his parenting skills, numerous other professionals who observed the father’s visits with his son indicated the father interacted well with his son, was very appropriate during parenting sessions and did not demonstrate any concerns about the ability to parent his son. In fact, the parent educator felt that it was safe and appropriate for the child to return to the father.

While the caseworker opined the father failed to appropriately discipline the child during parenting time, the father responded that since he saw his son so infrequently he didn’t wish to spend his time disciplining his son. In addition, while the father failed to take his son for an overnight visit on one occasion because the child was sick, the father explained, and the parent educator agreed, that dad merely wanted the child to be comfortable in his own bed which was premised on child’s own best interest. It was this ‘failure’ that resulted in the caseworker unreasonably (according to the Court of Appeals) suspending overnight visits for the father.

The caseworker also claimed because the father did not have full time employment he could not proper care and custody for the child. The father had been self employed for years. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the father was unable to support his son or was unable to pay his bills.

It was obvious that the Court of Appeals was disturbed by the caseworker’s handling of this case. It appears that she was focused on terminating the respondent’s parental rights from the time she became involved in the case. The caseworker claimed that the father had a substance abuse problem in the face of numbers of other professionals disputing that conclusion. Even though the father owned his own home and had no debt the caseworker was concerned about his ability to properly care for the child because he was not employed full time. The caseworker even went so far as indicating concerns for his parenting ability because he bought Parents Choice rather than Huggies diapers. In conclusion, the Court of Appeals opined that “no matter what respondent did in an attempt to reunify with his son, the (caseworker) would remain unsatisfied”.

In order to terminate, there needed to be shown “clear and convincing evidence” that a factual basis existed to establish a statutory basis for termination. Here, the trial court’s erroneous conclusions that the father had an “alcohol problem”, a “co dependency issue”, an “un-rectified parenting skills issue” and “lack of full time employment” did not rise to the “clear and convincing evidence” standard tending to establish any statutory ground for termination.

Because of the caseworker’s zealous efforts aimed at termination instead of reunification, the father was denied opportunities to use and practice parenting skills he learned in class as well as to develop more skills typically acquired through interactions between parent and child. He was also denied helpful guidance of a parent mentor because of the caseworker. On remand, the court directed additional efforts for reunification of the child with the father were to be commenced immediately. It also strongly recommended that the caseworker be removed from the case.

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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 6:03 pm

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http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/D ... eID=380561

¶1 Sheri L. Hadley (Mother) appeals a judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights to her children, K.C., T.C., K.C., and T.C. (Children). The issue on appeal is whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the State of Oklahoma (State) met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Children's best interests. We find there is not, reverse the judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

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Marina
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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 6:08 pm

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...a rare published termination of parental rights case, the COA reversed a decision of the Macomb County Family Court terminating respondents’ parental rights when they were deported to Guatemala.


http://courtofappeals.mijud.net/documen ... 61.opn.pdf

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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 6:11 pm

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http://courtofappeals.mijud.net/documen ... 31.opn.pdf

... In this instance, none of those grounds existed since it was the mother who agreed to plea to an allegation contained in the petition and not the “respondent” as required by statute. Consequently the trial court could not obtain jurisdiction and the order terminating rights was vacated.

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Marina
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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 6:15 pm

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This case is not a reversal, but is relevant.

http://courtofappeals.mijud.net/documen ... 24.opn.pdf

....conduct of a parent prior to establishing paternity can be used to support termination of his parental rights.

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Marina
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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 6:30 pm

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http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/ar ... 1.rdr.html

This opinion resolves the question of whether a parent may initially consent to the termination of her parental rights and later appear in open court and change her mind. We hold that she may.

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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 6:32 pm

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http://courts.state.ar.us/opinions/2006 ... 05-306.pdf

Given
the extraordinary progress appellant had made in fulfilling the requirements of the court, the
overwhelming evidence of the very strong bond between mother and children, and the
testimony from the therapist of appellant's daughter that the child would “regress,” the trial
court was clearly erroneous in finding that appellant’s continued contact with her children
would be detrimental; accordingly, the best interest of the children dictates that the appellate
court reverse the termination of appellant’s parental rights and reinstate reunification services
with a goal of returning the children to appellant’s custody.

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Marina
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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 6:52 pm

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http://courts.state.ar.us/opinions/2004 ... 3-332.html

Amanda Trout appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to two of her children, D.T. and W.T. On appeal, Trout argues that the trial court erred in (1) terminating her parental rights against the weight of the evidence presented at the termination hearing and (2) terminating her parental rights as to W.T. but because the child had not been out of the home for a period of one year. We reverse and remand.


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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 6:55 pm

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https://www.abanet.org/litigation/commi ... lling.html

In re Walling
2006 Ohio 810, 2006 WL 445981 (Ohio App. 1 Dist. 2006)



This termination of parental rights case involved a five (5) year old boy whose mother had alcohol and substance abuse and mental health issues. The record established that the mother and the child were bonded, that the mother worked “more often than not,” that the mother’s apartments were satisfactory, and that the mother did her best to care for the child. The mother’s failings were her failure to adhere to the lower court’s initial orders following adjudication of dependency. The mother’s case plan compliance was only partial. The child’s guardian ad litem filed a report supporting termination of the mother’s parental rights but failed to indicate the child’s wishes.



In this, the mother’s second appeal (she established in her first appeal that she was ineffectively represented by counsel), the court of appeals held that no clear and convincing evidence of harm to the child existed because the state failed to prove that the mother’s noncompliance with the initial orders equated to a lack of adequate parental care or created a condition or environment that necessitated the state to assume guardianship. The court cautioned that the focus is the child’s condition and not the parent’s fault.



The court also reversed termination of parental rights because the lower court failed to ensure that the child’s interests were properly represented.

First, the court restated Ohio law as requiring consideration of the child’s wishes before the entry of an order terminating parental rights. Because the guardian ad litem did not report the child’s wishes and because the lower court failed to conduct an in camera interview to determine the child’s wishes, reversal was required.



Second, the court of appeals applied In re Williams, 805 N.E.2d 1110 (Ohio 2004), which held that “a child who is the subject of a juvenile court proceeding to terminate parental rights is a party to that proceeding and, therefore, is entitled to independent counsel in certain circumstances.” The court of appeals explained that “[t]he ‘certain circumstances’ to which the decision refers are instances where a child’s wishes are in conflict with his GAL’s recommendation where the GAL is also serving as the child’s attorney. If this occurs, the court should, at a minimum, conduct an in-camera, recorded interview with the child, giving due regard to the maturity of the child, in order to determine whether independent counsel is needed.”


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Postby Marina » Sun Jul 13, 2008 6:57 pm

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http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/c ... 0629-1.htm

The trial court abused its discretion by terminating respondent mother's parental rights to her sixteen-year-old son based on neglect and abandonment under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (7), because:

(1) it cannot be in the minor child's best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights and thereby render the child a legal orphan;

(2) it is highly unlikely that a child of this age and physical and mental condition would be a candidate for adoption, much less selected by an adoptive family; and

(3) the remote chance of adoption does not justify the momentous step of terminating respondent's parental rights.

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